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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

CARLOS HERRERA, and K E N N Y
NAVAREZ,

8804

Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At trial, commencing on July 25, 1957, before the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, the
appellants were convicted of the crime of rape. The evidence adduced at trial disclosed that the incident occurred
on the outskirts of Ogden on the night of June 6, 1957. The
State's evidence was to the effect that the appellants raped
the prosecutrix, a married woman, 15 years of age. The
evidence, as presented by the defense, conceded that the
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appellants had each engaged in sexual intercourse but was
to the effect that such acts were voluntary and with the
prosecutrix's consent. The question of resistance was therefore the substantial factual issue before the Court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EXTENT OF CROSS EXAMINATION OF
THE DEFENSE WITNESS BORELLA AS PERMITTED BY THE COURT WAS NOT ERROR.

POINT II.
THE EXAMINATION BY THE PROSECUTION
OF CERTAIN OF ITS OWN WITNESSES WAS
NOT ERROR.
POINT III.
IF THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERRORS,
SUCH ERRORS, WHEN VIEWED TOGETHER,
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE TO THE
DEFENDANTS WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF
CUMULATIVE ERROR.

POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANTS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE EXTENT OF CROSS EXAMINATION OF
THE DEFENSE WITNESS BORELLA AS PERMITTED BY THE COURT WAS NOT ERROR.
Appellants object to certain cross examination of their
witness Borella. See pages 171 to 172 of the transcript and
pages 5, 6 and 7 of appellants' brief. The District Attorney
in attempting to impeach the witness through cross examination brought out previous arrests and instances of misconduct.
The law in this country is not uniform in that area
concerning the permissible extent of cross examination of
a witness for impeachment purposes. It is admitted that a
majority of the courts hold that evidence of arrests, without showing convictions, may not be admitted. See Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 979, Vol. III. Appellants do not object here to the introduction of evidence
of arrests, or of specific instances of misconduct, because
that was not done, but rather, object to the questions put
to the witness by the prosecutor. The scope of cross examination is broad. The H oughensen case, cited by appellants, State v. Houghensen (1936 Utah), 64 P. 2d 229, contains at pages 238 and 239 a number of principles which
the court suggests as guides in the conduct of cross examination. Rule (3) as stated by the court is as follows:
"Questions whose only object could be to call
for answers to affect the credibility of the witness
and which answers would tend to degrade his or her
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character, but not tend to subject such witness to
punishment for a felony, are permissible over a general objection as to their relevancy or competency,
in the sound discretion of the court."
It is submitted that the trial court has broad discretion in
determining the extent of cross examination of a witness.
A number of decisions rest on the principle that the admission or exclusion of evidence of arrests is left with the sound
discretion of the trial court. See Tollifson v. People (1910
Colo.), 112 P. 794; State v. Bowers (1921 Kan.), 194 P.
650; and Denny v. State (1921 Ind.), 129 N. E. 308.
It is further submitted that the principal obstacle upon
which Point I of appellants' argument falls is that the
error, if such was committed, was not prejudicial. It is
alleged that the admission of the evidence "destroyed the
value of his [the witness's] evidence in the eyes of the
jury", but that is mere supposition on the part of appellants. The attempts to impeach the witness Borella were
only efforts to reflect on the witness's character for veracity. Considering the nature of the cross examination, the
questions put, it could not have seriously discredited the
witness. It is to be remembered that this was not the accused who was being cross examined. Even assuming for
the sake of argument appellants' position, analysis of the
witness's testimony reveals that it played an insignificant
part in the case for the defense. In substance, the witness
Borella testified that he had previously "dated" the prosecutrix; that he was in the car together with the prosecutrix
and others earlier during the evening of the incident; that
she drank beer and that she was kissing boys in the car;
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all relating to the witness's acquaintance with the prosecutrix and to her conduct on the evening of the alleged assault.
His testimony did not go directly to the fundamental issues
in a rape conviction. He did not testify that he had ever
had sexual relations with the prosecutrix, nor did he testify
of her character as to chastity. He was not present at the
time of the rape and therefore could offer no testimony on
the essential question of resistance.

It is noted that a number of the cited cases in appellants' brief, pages 8 and 9 directed to this point, are cases
which involve the cross examination of the accused. Here
we are concerned with the cross examination of witnesses
-not the parties to the action. In both Ross v. United
States (1937 C. C. A. 7th), 93 F. 2d 950, and State v. Nyhus,
129 N. W. 71, cited on page 9 of appellants' brief, the question concerned the cross examination of the defendant. So
far as the matter of prejudicial error arises, it is submitted
that error committed in the impeachment of a party would
likely result in more prejudice than error committed in the
impeachment of a witness, not a party.

POINT II.
THE EXAMINATION BY THE PROSECUTION
OF CERTAIN OF ITS OWN WITNESSES WAS
NOT ERROR.
It is alleged as Point II of appellants' brief that the
court erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach various
of its witnesses; specifically Dr. Hirst and Johnny Dominguez.
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The redirect examination of Dr. Hirst by the prosecution as recorded on pages 56 and 57 of the transcript, although involving leading questions, did not constitute impeachment of the witness. There are two grounds upon
which a party may cross examine or ask leading questions
of his own witness: (1) where the party is surprised by
the witness's testimony; and (2) to refresh a witness's
memory or recollection. The following general principle
is quoted from 98 C. J. S.:
"Page 236, § 428, WITNESSES.
"To refresh a witness's memory or recollection
it may be permissible to ask leading questions, and
to call his attention to previous conversations or
statements had with relation to the subject of his
testimony."
Page 367, § 484, WITNESSES.
"A party may cross-examine his own witness
when he has been surprised by the witness's testimony."
See also 58 Am. Jur. 342, Sec. 618, Witnesses. This court,
in the case of Morton v. Hood (1943 Utah), 143 P. 2d 434,
affirmed the rule that a party under certain circumstances
may cross examine his own witness. The court said:
"We are of the opinion that when a witness has
made statements on a prior occasion which would
induce counsel acting in good faith to call such person as a witness, and when testifying such witness
gives testimony materially different from the prior
statement; the party so surprised and misled by such
adverse testimony, under proper circumstances,
should not only be. permitted to ask leading questions to refresh the recollection of the witness as to
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the prior declarations, but if the witness asserts that
such questions or reference to alleged prior declarations do not refresh his memory, or he denies making such statements, or refuses to answer, or even
professes that he is unable to remember; proof of
such prior statements should be received, not as substantive evidence of the facts about which such
statements were made, but to offset the effect of
the surprise adverse testimony."
It is noted that on page 58 of the transcript in response to
counsel's objection, the court said: "You may proceed on
surprise."
As a second argument contained within Point II of
appellants' brief, it is urged that the court erred in permitting the prosecutor to ask certain questions of his own
witness, one Johnny Dominguez. The prosecution had called
this witness who had been present during the early hours
of the evening of the assault and who testified as to the
persons present and what transpired during the time that
he was present. He testified that he was a very good friend
of both defendants. The following testimony is quoted from
page 246 of the transcript, and includes that which appellants object to:
You may cross examine. One other question. Have you been in the Industrial School?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.

You have been in a lot of trouble have you?
I haven't been in trouble for a long time

now.
You haven't been in any trouble for a long
time now. Is that right?
"A. Two years ago."
"Q.
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It is noted that earlier during the witness's testimony the
court allowed the prosecutor to lead the witness, commenting that he was "obviously reluctant."
The transcript reveals that appellants made no objection at trial to the questions. It is a general rule of appeal
law that an appellate court will consider only those questions as were raised and reserved at trial. See 3 Am. Jur.
25, Sec. 246, Appeal and Error. The rule is one of fairness,
based on the reasonable requirement that reversals should
not be granted on grounds of objection which might have
been obviated by a timely objection raised at trial. Prior
to the adoption of the present rules of civil procedure, it
was necessary, in order to preserve a question on appeal,
to make exception to the court ruling at the trial. Present
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the
court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party,
at the time the ruling or order of the court is made
or sought, makes known to the court the action which
he desires the court to take or his objection to the
action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if
a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or
order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him."
Although the section abolishes the requirement that an exception be taken, it certainly implies that in order to preserve the question on appeal the party either make known
to the court the action he desires the court to take or else
that he objuct to the court's action. In the instant case,
appellants remained silent. It is conceded that in certain
situations where the error is of such magnitude or mani-
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festly prejudicial to the accused, that the Appellate Court
should not refuse to consider the question, even though objection was not made below. The error presented to this
court is technical and of minor significance. It is submitted
that inasmuch as appellants failed to raise objection at trial,
they cannot now demand that this court consider the question.
It is further submitted that it was within the discretion of the trial judge to permit the questions. The latitude
allowed a pary in cross examining his own witness is generally a matter within the discretionary powers of the trial
judge. See 98 C. J. S. 367, Sec. 484, Witnesses. The court
here, in the exercise of such discretion, permitted the questions. This court, in the case of Xenakis v. Garrett Freightlines (1954 Utah), 265 P. 2d 1007, said:
"There is no doubt that, where a party is surprised at finding that a witness believed to be favorable is in fact adverse, it is permissible to crossexamine the witness and to put leading questions
to him, and the extent to which this may be done is,
generally speaking, within the discretion of the presiding judge. * * *"
POINT III.
IF THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERRORS,
SUCH ERRORS, WHEN VIEWED TOGETHER,
DID NOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE TO THE
DEFENDANTS WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF
CUMULATIVE ERROR.
Defendants have raised specifically three errors, discussed in Points I and II. It is significant that all three
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touch merely on collateral matters. They do not involve the
testimony of the prosecutrix or of either of the defendants,
and they do not relate to the primary issue before the trial
court, viz., whether the prosecutrix resisted and was overcome by force or violence. (It was conceded by appellants
that they engaged in sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix.)
The first alleged error related to questions asked for
the purpose of impeaching one of.appellants' witnesses. The
second concerned leading questions asked of a doctor, the
State's witness, pertaining to a statement previously made
by the witness indicating abrasions on the prosecutrix's
legs. The third related to impeachment questions asked
of one of the State's witnesses.
Section 77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides that where
error has been committed it shall not be presumed to have
resulted in prejudice and that the Appellate Court shall
not give regard to errors which do not affect the substantial rights of the accused. It is submitted that the errors
here, if any, were minor, technical in nature and not prejudicial to the rights of appellants.

POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANTS.
The appellants attack the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the conviction. A basic principle of appellate
review provides that an appellate court will not ~eview
questions of fact; that being the function of the jury. The
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court may, however, make a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence and if the verdict is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing court will not disturb
it. See 3 Am. Jur., Sees. 883 and 887, Appeal and Error,
and 5A C. J. S., Sec. 1647, Appeal and Error.
This court has held that where there is evidence to
support the jury's verdict it will not be overturned by a
reviewing court. Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation (1949 Utah), 202 P. 2d 727; see also Angerman
v. Edgemon (1930 Utah), 290 P. 169. The above stated rule
applies to criminal as well as to civil verdicts. See State v.
Mann (1941 No. Caro.), 13 S. E. 2d 247, where the Supreme
Court of North Carolina said :
"It is not the province of this court to weigh
the testimony and determine what the verdict should
have been, but only to see whether there was any
evidence for the jury to consider; if there was, the
jury alone could determine its weight."
See also State v. Johnson (1955 Ida.), 287 P. 2d 425. There
was evidence here to support the jury's verdict.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should affirm the conviction of appellants.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
GARY L. THEURER,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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